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Abstract
Causal and total order broadcast has been proposed as a mechanism to
provide fault tolerance for constructing reliable distributed systems. The use
of formal methods to develop a model of a system, specifying critical properties
and the veri¯cation of them is a way of obtaining better design of dependable
services. Event-B is a formal technique which provides a framework for de-
veloping mathematical models of distributed systems by rigorous description
of the problem, gradually introducing solutions in the re¯nement steps, and
veri¯cation of solutions by discharge of proof obligations. In this paper, we
present a formal development of a system where processes communicate by
broadcast and the messages are delivered following a causal and a total order.
We ¯rst present separate models of a broadcast system each for a causal or-
der and a total order. Subsequently, we verify that the models of the system
preserves the required ordering properties. Further, we develop a model of a
system satisfying both causal and a total order on the messages. Later in the
re¯nement, we outline how these ordering properties can correctly be imple-
mented by the vector clocks. In this approach we discover some interesting
invariant properties which describes the relationship of abstract causal and
total order with the vector clocks and the sequence numbers.
Keywords : Distributed System, Formal Method, Veri¯cation, Message
Ordering, Event-B
1 Introduction
Distributed systems are di±cult to understand, build and reason about due to un-
avoidable concurrency [20]. In a fully asynchronous message passing system, there is
no natural ordering of the messages. In such systems there is no concept of real time
and it is assumed that messages are eventually delivered and processes eventually
respond, but no assumption on time can be made. Group communication primitives
provides higher guarantees on the delivery of messages to di®erent processes. These
group communication primitives have been used as a basic building block for the
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1development of reliable fault tolerant distributed applications [12]. The solutions
based on group communication are used in the real world. For example, ISIS [8]
based solutions are used at the New York Stock Exchange for providing reliable
multicast communication, Swiss Electronic Bourse and for developing new genera-
tion of the French Air Tra±c Control System [13]. These primitives have also been
proposed for processing transactions and managing replicated databases [16, 17, 18].
The total order [12] broadcast is one primitive which ensures that a message is de-
livered to the di®erent recipient processes in the same order. The total order alone
does not guarantee that messages are delivered in the order they were sent. The
causal order [9, 12] primitive provide guarantees that delivery order is also consis-
tent with the order they were sent. A causal order on the messages are build when
they are sent by a single process (FIFO order) or the di®erent processes(local order).
In this paper we present a formal development of a system that guarantees a total
order conforming with the causal dependencies. This totally ordered causal broad-
cast ¯rst builds a causal order then a total order on the messages. Our approach
of gradual development of the system is based on the notion of abstraction and re-
¯nement. The important feature of this approach is to formally de¯ne an abstract
global model of a system independent of the architecture and successively re¯ne it
to a detailed distributed design in a series of intermediate steps. The work present
in the paper constitutes a part of our work on formal development of transactions
for replicated databases [28].
Distributed algorithms can be deceptive. An algorithm that looks simple may
have complex execution paths and allow unanticipated behavior. Rigorous reasoning
about the algorithms is required to ensure that an algorithm achieves what is it
supposed to do [20]. The group communication services have been studied as a basic
building block for many fault tolerant distributed services, however the application
of formal methods for providing clear speci¯cations and proofs of correctness is
rare [12]. Some of the important work on application of formal methods to group
communication services in order to verify the properties of algorithm are [13, 27].
The work reported in [13] uses I/O automata for the speci¯cations and proves
properties about all trace behavior of the automation. A series of invariants relating
state variables and reachable states are proved by hand using method of induction.
In [27] formal results are provided that de¯nes whether or not a totally ordered
protocol provides a causal order. They provide a proof of correctness by doing
proofs by hand. Instead, our approach is based on de¯ning properties in abstract
model and proving that our model of algorithm is a correct re¯nement of the abstract
model. Also, we use a tool for generating proof obligations and discharging them.
The approach of specifying the system and veri¯cation is based on the technique
of abstraction and re¯nement. This technique is supported by the Event-B [2, 22],
an event driven approach used together with B Method [1]. This formal technique
consists of the following steps :
- Rigorous description of abstract problem.
- Introduce solutions or details in re¯nement steps to obtain more concrete
speci¯cations.
- Verifying that proposed re¯nements are valid.
This formal approach supports a step-wise development from initial abstract speci¯-
cations to a detailed design of a system in the re¯nement steps. Through re¯nement
we verify that the design of detailed system conforms to the abstract speci¯cations.
We have used the Click'n'Prove [4] B tool for proof obligation generation and for
discharging proof obligations. The tool generate proof obligations for re¯nement
2and consistency checking. These proofs help to understand the complexity of prob-
lem and the correctness of the solutions. They also guide us to discover new system
invariants which provide a clear insight to the system.
The approach for building causal and total order on the messages is based on
the work reported in ISIS [9]. We present separate models of message passing
systems each for causal order and a total order. These models of message passing
system delivers the messages following a causal order and a total order respectively.
We also verify that these models of the system preserves the required ordering
properties. Further we develop a model of a system satisfying both causal and
a total order on the messages. In the re¯nement, we show that this model can
correctly be re¯ned by a system of vector clocks. In the re¯nement, the causal
order is implemented by using a vector clock while the total order is implemented
using a ¯xed sequencer algorithm [12]. In the further re¯nement, we verify that a
total order can be build by using the services of vector clocks alone thus replacing
the need for explicit sequence numbers to be generated by a sequencer. We also
discover some interesting properties as invariants which describes the relationship
between abstract causal and total order with the vector clocks and the sequence
numbers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our
modelling approach and introduction to Event-B notations , Section 3 informally
presents various ordering properties, Section 4 present abstract B speci¯cation of
causal order properties, Section 5 present abstract B speci¯cation of total order
properties, Section 6 present the speci¯cation of a system which respect both total
and a causal order, lastly section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Modelling Approach in Event-B
The Event-B [2, 22] is a formal technique consist of describing rigorously the prob-
lem, introduce solutions or details in the re¯nement steps to obtain more concrete
speci¯cations, and verifying that proposed solutions are correct. The system is mod-
elled in terms of an abstract state space using variables with set theoretic types and
the events that modify state variables. Event-B, a variant of B [1], was designed for
developing distributed systems. In Event-B, the events consists of guarded actions
occurring spontaneously rather then being invoked. The invariants state properties
that must be satis¯ed by the variables and maintained by the activation of the
events.
In the re¯nement steps, guards may be strengthened and the new events may be
introduced. Abstract and concrete variables are related through gluing invariants.
At each re¯nement step a more concrete speci¯cation of the system are obtained.
This technique requires the discharge of the proof obligations for consistency check-
ing and re¯nement checking. The consistency checking involves showing that a
machine preserves the invariants when events are invoked. The re¯nement check-
ing involves showing that the speci¯cations at each re¯nement step are valid. We
have used the Click'n'Prove [4] B tool for proof management which provides an
environment for generation of proof obligations for consistency checking and re-
¯nement checking. This tool also provides an automatic and an interactive prover.
The majority of the proof obligations are proved by the automatic prover however
some of the complex proof obligations need to be proved interactively. Some of
the applications of the B method to distributed systems are modelling web based
system [25], veri¯cation of one copy equivalence criterion in a distributed database
system [28], veri¯cation of IEEE 1394 tree protocol distributed algorithm [5], and
a general modelling approach for distributed system may be found in [10, 11].
32.1 Event-B Notations
The Event-B notations are based on set theoretic notations and frequently used
notations in our models are explained here.
Let A and B be two sets, then the relational constructor ($) de¯nes the set of
relations between A and B as :
A $ B = P(A £ B)
where £ is cartesian product of A and B. A mapping of element a 2 A and b 2 B
in a relation R 2 A $ B is written as a 7! b.
The domain of a relation R 2 A $ B is the set of elements of A that R relates
to some elements in B de¯ned as :
dom(R) = fa j a 2 A ^ 9b:(b 2 B ^ a 7! b 2 R)g
Similarly, the range of relation R 2 A $ B is de¯ned as set of elements in B related
to some element in A de¯ned as :
ran(R) = fb j b 2 B ^ 9a:(a 2 A ^ a 7! b 2 R)g
A relation R 2 A $ B can be projected on a domain U µ A called domain restric-
tion(¢) de¯ned as
U ¢ R = fa 7! b j a 7! b 2 R ^ a 2 Ug
The domain anti-restriction (U ¢ ¡ R) is de¯ned as :
U ¢ ¡ R = fa 7! b j a 7! b 2 R ^ a = 2 Ug
The Relational image R[U] where UµA is de¯ned as :
R[U] = fb j 9a ¢ a 7! b 2 R ^ a 2 Ug
The relational inverse (R¡1) of a relation R is de¯ned as :
R¡1 = fb 7! a j a 7! b 2 Rg
If R0 2 A $ B and R1 2 A $ B are relations de¯ned on set A and B, the relational
over-ride operator (R0 ¢ ¡ R1) replaces mappings in relation R0 by those in relation
R1.
R0 ¢ ¡ R1 = (dom(R1) ¢ ¡ R0) [ R1
A function is a relation with certain restrictions. The function may be a partial
function ( 7 !) or a total function(!).
A partial function from set A to B (A 7 ! B) is a relation which relates an
element in A to at most one element in B.
A total function from set A to B (A ! B) is a partial function where dom(f)=A
i.e. each element of set A is related to exactly one element of set B. Given f 2 A
7 ! B and a 2 dom(f), f(a) represents the unique value that a is mapped to by f.
2.2 Event-B System
The mathematical foundations for development of event based system in B is dis-
cussed in [3]. An abstract machine consists of sets, constants and variables clause
modelled as set theoretic constructs. The invariants and properties are de¯ned as
¯rst order predicates. The event system is de¯ned by its state and contain number
4of events. The state is de¯ned by variables. The constants and variables are con-
strained by the conditions de¯ned in the properties and invariant clause known as
invariant properties of the system. Each event in the abstract model is composed
of a guard and an action. The events are modelled using generalized substitution
which include construct like assignment (x:= E(x)) and guarded statement (WHEN
G THEN S END). A typical abstract machine may be outlined as below.
MACHINE M
SETS S1,S2,S3...
CONSTANTS C
PROPERTIES P
VARIABLES v1,v2,v3...
INVARIANTS I
INITIALISATION init
EVENTS
E1 » = WHEN G1 THEN S1 END;
E2 » = WHEN G1 THEN S1 END;
.......
END
In the guarded statement(WHEN G THEN S END), the guard(G) of the events
are expressed as ¯rst order predicate. The actions of an events are speci¯ed as
simultaneous assignment of state variable using substitution statements(S). The
events occur spontaneously whenever their guard holds (true) and they are executed
atomically. After building a model of a system as abstract machine, it must be
proved that a system is consistent with respect to the invariant properties of the
system. The consistency of the machine is shown by proving that each event of the
system preserves the invariant.
In an incremental development approach for system modelling, we begin with
abstract de¯nition of problem. The system in build in several stages by gradually
introducing the details in the re¯nement steps. At every re¯nement step we verify
that proposed re¯nements are valid. An abstract machine can be re¯ned by adding
new events and new variable. A re¯ned system state must relate to the abstract
one by abstraction relation. This abstraction relation is de¯ned by a invariant
known as Gluing Invariant. This invariant de¯nes relationship between abstract
state variables and concrete(re¯ned) state variables. More precisely, if a statement
S that acts on variable x, is re¯ned by another statement T that acts on variable
y under invariants I then we write S vI T. The invariant I is called the gluing
invariant and it de¯nes the relationships between x and y. The each event of
abstract model is re¯ned to one or more corresponding concrete event. A concrete
event is said to re¯ne corresponding abstract one, if it is obtained by strengthening
the guards of abstract one and the gluing invariant is preserved by joined action of
both event.
Replacing the abstract variable by the concrete variable in the re¯nement results
in proof obligations generated by the B tool. These proof obligations are associated
with the events in the re¯nement. The B Tool help to factorize the large and complex
proof obligations in to simpler proof obligations. In most cases majority of the proof
are proved by the automatic prover, however in some cases we need to prove them
by interaction. The B Tool also remembers the proved and unproved proofs in the
form of proof tree. In some cases, in order to prove unproved proof obligations
we may have to add gluing invariants to the model. In these cases the unproved
proof obligations guide us to construct the gluing invariants. The addition of new
gluing invariants further generate the proof obligations which may require addition
of new gluing invariants. After several stages of invariant strengthening we arrive at
5m1 7! m2 2 corder ^
m2 7! p 2 sender
)
((m1 7! p) 2 sender) [ ((p 7! m1) 2 cdeliver)
This invariant is given as Inv 3 in the Fig. 10. After adding invariant Inv 3 to
the model we discharge the proof obligations PO2 and PO3 associated with the
Broadcast event. However, due to addition of Inv 3 additional proof obligations
associated with Broadcast and CausalDeliver events are generated. The proof obli-
gation associated with the Broadcast event is discharged using interactive prover.
The following proof obligation associated with CausalDeliver event can not be dis-
charged interactively.
CausalDeliver(pp;mm)PO4 2
6
6 6
6
4
Inv 3 ^
m1 7! m2 2 corder
pp 7! m2 2 cdeliver
)
m1 2 (sender¡1[fppg]) [ (cdeliver[fppg])
3
7
7 7
7
5
The PO4 state that for message m1 and m2 where m1 causally precedes m2
and a process pp has delivered m2 then pp has either delivered m1 or broadcasted
m1. On simplifying the PO4 with the hypothesis given as Inv 2, it require us to
prove following.
m1 7! m2 2 corder ^
p 7! m2 2 cdeliver
)
p 7! m1 2 cdeliver
We add above as an invariant to our model given as Inv 4 in the Fig. 10. It
state that if m1 causally precedes m2 then for any process p who has delivered m2
implies that it has also delivered m1. After adding invariant Inv 4 to the model
we are able to discharge PO4. Addition of Inv 4 generate new proof obligations
associated with Broadcast and CausalDeliver events. These proof obligations are
also discharged interactively using interactive prover. It can be noticed that invari-
ant Inv 4 also state the causal order correctness criterion and is discovered during
invariant strengthening.
We observe that after three iteration of invariant strengthening we arrive at a
set of invariants that is su±cient to discharge all proof obligations. By discharg-
ing all proof obligations we ensure that this model preserves the causal precedence
relationship on the messages.
4.5 Second Re¯nement : Introducing Vector Clocks
In this section we present how abstract causal order can be implemented by vector
clocks. The goals of this re¯nement are given below.
{ To replace abstract global variable corder with equivalent vector clock rules.
{ To re¯ne operation Broadcast to generate the vector timestamp of message
which is equivalent to global causal order.
{ To re¯ne operation CausalDeliver to include a mechanism by which early
message or messages violating the global causal order may be detected at the
recipient process.
14In a system of vector clocks [9, 7, 23, 24], every process maintains a vector of size
N where N is the total number of processes in the system. Process Pi maintains
a vector clock VTPi where VTPi(i) is the local logical time at Pi while VTPi(j)
represents the process Pi's latest knowledge of the time at process Pj. More
precisely VTPi(j) (i6=j) represents the time of occurrence of an event at process Pj
when the most recent message was sent from Pj to Pi directly or indirectly.
In our model, we use following vector rules [9] to update the vector clock of a
process sending or receiving a message and to timestamp a message.
I. While sending a message M from process Pi to Pj, sender process Pi updates
its own time( ith entry of vector) by updating VTPi(i) as VTPi(i) := VTPi(i)
+ 1. The message time stampVTM of message M is generated as VTM(k) :=
VTPi(k), 8 k 2 ( 1..N), where N is number of processes in system. Since a
process Pi increments its own value only at the time of sending a message,
VTPi(i) indicates number of messages sent out by process Pi.
II. The recipient process Pj delays the delivery of message M until following
conditions are satis¯ed.
i VTPj(i)= VTM(i) - 1
ii VTPj(k)¸ VTM(k), 8k 2 (1..N) ^ (k 6= i).
The ¯rst condition ensures that process Pj has received all but one mes-
sage sent by process Pi. The second condition ensures that process Pj has
received all messages received by sender Pi before sending the message M.
These conditions ensures global ordering on messages.
III. The recipient process Pj updates its vector clock VTPj at message receive
event of message M as VTPj(k) := max (VTPj(k),VTM (k)). Therefore
in vector clock of process Pj, VTPj(i) indicates the number of messages
delivered to process Pj sent by process Pi.
This re¯nement(second re¯nement) consists of four state variables sender, cde-
liver, VTP and VTM. The new state variables VTP and VTM respectively rep-
resents vector time of a process and the vector time stamp of a message. These
variables are typed as follows.
V TP 2 PROCESS ! (PROCESS ! NATURAL)
V TM 2 MESSAGE ! (PROCESS ! NATURAL)
These variables are initialized as follows,
V TP := PROCESS £ fPROCESS £ 0g
V TM := MESSAGE £ fPROCESS £ 0g
As shown above, the variables VTP and VTM are initialized by assigning a array
of vector initialized with zero to each process and messages.
The re¯ned speci¯cations of Broadcast, and CausalDeliver event are given in
Fig 11. As shown in the BroadCast speci¯cations operations involving abstract
variable corder are replaced by the vector rules. It can be noticed that at the
time of broadcasting a message mm, process pp increments its own clock value
VTP(pp)(pp) by one. The VTP(pp)(pp) represents the number of messages sent by
process pp. The modi¯ed vector timestamp of process is assigned to message mm
giving vector timestamp of message mm.
As shown in the event CausalDeliver, the messages are delivered at a process
only if it has delivered all but one message from the sender of that message. Vector
timestamp of recipient process and message are also compared to ensure that all
15This property on the messages states that for two computation message m1 and
m2 if m1 is totally ordered before m2 then for any process p who has delivered m2
implies that it has also delivered m1. In order to discharge the this proof obligations
we add Inv-7 given in Fig. 19.
When we add this invariant to our model it generate further proof obligations
associated with the events Broadcast, Deliver and TOdeliver. The proof obligation
associated with TOdeliver is discharged using automatic prover. The simpli¯ed
form of proof obligation associated with the events BroadCast which can not be
discharged automatically is given below.
BroadCast(pp;mm)PO4 2
6 6
6 6
6
6 6
6 6
6
4
Inv7
mm = 2 dom(sender)
(pp 7! m2) 2 tdeliver
(mm 7! m2) 2 totalorder
m1 = mm
m2 6= mm
)
(pp 7! mm) 2 tdeliver
3
7 7
7 7
7
7 7
7 7
7
5
It can be noticed that there is a contradiction in the hypothesis of this proof obli-
gation i.e., the hypothesis mm = 2 dom(sender) and (mm 7! m2) 2 totalorder can
not be true simultaneously because of our assumption that a totalorder is built only
when a message has been sent out. Similarly, the goal (pp 7! mm) 2 tdeliver can
not be proved under the hypothesis mm = 2 dom(sender). Thus we add following
invariant(s) to our model given as Inv-8,9 in Fig. 19.
8m :( m 2 ( dom(totalorder) [ ran(totalorder) ) ) m 2 ran(tdeliver))
8(m):(m = 2 dom(sender) ) m = 2 ran(totalorder))
8(m):(m = 2 dom(sender) ) m = 2 dom(totalorder))
ran(deliver) µ dom(sender)
Addition of these invariants were su±cient to discharge all proof obligations. There-
fore after four iterations of invariant strengthening we arrive at a set of invariant
that is su±cient to discharge all proof obligations generated due the addition of Inv
6. A full set of invariant are given in the Fig. 19.
5.3 First Re¯nement : Introducing Sequencer
In this re¯nement we introduce the notion of the sequencer. The re¯nement given
in the Fig. 20 re¯nes abstract model given in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. The sequencer
is de¯ned as a constant for this model as sequencer 2 PROCESS. As shown in the
re¯ned speci¯cation of Deliver event given in Fig. 20, a message is ¯rst delivered
to the sequencer process. It can be noticed that the the following guards in the
abstract speci¯cation
mm = 2 ran(tdeliver)
ran(tdeliver) µ tdeliver[pp]
are replaced by following.
pp = sequencer
(sequencer 7! mm) = 2 tdeliver
The replacement of the guards in the Deliver event generate new proof obli-
gations. Using the same approach of invariant discovery, we arrived at a set of
invariants which was su±cient to discharge all proof obligations. These invariants
are given in Fig. 21. A brief description of these invariants are given in the following
steps.
24The set ran(messcontrol) contains the computation messages for which control mes-
sages has been sent by the sequencer. In the operations of event SendControl, it can
be noticed that the sequencer also builds the causal order on the control messages
and the variable messcontrol is updated by adding a corresponding mapping. A
total order for the computation messages mm is also build by the sequencer by
updating abstract variable totaloder as :
totalorder := totalorder [ (m £ fmmg)
where m = ran(messcontrol). This implies that all computation messages, for which
sequencer has already sent out control messages, are now totally ordered before mm.
The event TOdeliver event models of totally ordered delivery of a computation
message to a process. This event is activated when a process pp codelivers a control
message mc. The guard of the event ensures that on codelivery of a control message
mc by a process pp, it delivers a computation message in total order corresponding
to the control message mc if it has already delivered all computation messages which
are totally ordered before computation message de¯ned as messcontrol(mc). It may
be noted that messcontrol(mc) represents a computation message corresponding to
the control message mc. Upon todelivery of a message mm the variable tdelorder is
also updated so that all messages todelivered to the process pp are ordered before
mm.
6.2 Invariant Properties of Total Causal Order
Some of the important invariant properties of our model of total causal order are
given in Fig. 31 as ¯rst order predicates. The codes for the events are given in the
Table 3. A brief description of these properties is given below.
{ If message m1 causally precedes m2 and a process p has codelivered m2 then
delivery order at the process p must have been m1 followed by m2 (Inv-1).
{ For two messages m1 and m2 where m1 is todelivered before m2 at a process
p ( m1 7! m2 2 delorder(p)) then m1 precedes m2 in abstract total order
(Inv-2).
{ A message is ¯rst codelivered to a process then it is todelivered to the process.
This invariant state that a message delivered in a total order is also in a causal
order (Inv-3).
{ The transitivity property on causal precedence relationship on the messages
holds on our model of causally and totally ordered broadcast(Inv-4).
{ For two messages m1 and m2, if m1 causally precedes m2 and process p
has codelivered the message m2 then p has also codelivered the message m1
(Inv-5).
{ The transitivity property on Total Order relationship on the messages also
holds on our model of causally and totally ordered broadcast(Inv-6) .
{ For two messages m1 and m2, if m1 precedes m2 in total order and process
p has todelivered the message m2 then p has also todelivered m1 (Inv-7).
{ For any two messages m1 and m2 whose control message has been sent out
i.e., m1,m2 2 ran(messcontrol) and that m1 causally precedes m2 then a total
order also exist among them i.e. m1 is totally ordered before m2. It can be
noticed that that message type of each message in the set ran(messcontrol) is
computation (Inv-8) .
34greater than or equal to the number of messages received by sender(m) from
p (Inv-13).
- A message whose time stamp is a vector of zero's implies that it is not
causally ordered(Inv-14). It may be noted that due to invariants dom(order)
µ dom(sender) and ran(order) µ dom(sender) ( given in Fig. ??), it is also
implied that these massages have not been sent.
- If computation messages corresponding to the control messages m1 and m2
are in totalorder then sequence number of m1 is less then the sequence number
of m2 (Inv-15).
6.5 Constructing Gluing Invariants
In this section we brie°y outline how the gluing invariants given in Fig 35 are
constructed.
Relationship of abstract causal order and vector clock rules
The replacement of the guards and operations involving variable causalorder in
the abstract model by the equivalent rules of vector clock generate several proof
obligations due to re¯nement checking. Initially, the only proof obligation that can
not be proved is given below. It involve relationship between causalorder and vector
timestamp of message generated by the event CausalDeliver.
CausalDeliver(pp;mm)PO1 2
6
6 6
6
6 6
6 6
6
6
4
mm 2 dom(sender) ^
(pp 7! mm) = 2 cdeliver ^
8p:(p 2 PROCESS ) V TM(mm)(p) ¸ V TP(pp)(p) ^
V TP(pp)(sender(mm)) = V TM(mm)(sender(mm)) ¡ 1 ^
m 2 MESSAGE
m 7! mm 2 causalorder
)
(pp 7! m) 2 cdeliver
3
7
7 7
7
7 7
7 7
7
7
5
In this proof obligation it can be noticed that a message m causally precedes mm
i.e.,(m 7! mm) 2 causalorder and process pp has not codelivered mm. According to
vector clock rules, pp can codeliver mm only when it has codelivered all messages
inclusive of m which causally precedes mm. If a process pp has codelivered all but
one message from sender of mm then following must be hold,
V TP(pp)(sender(mm)) = V TM(mm)(sender(mm)) ¡ 1
Similarly, if a process pp has codelivered all messages sent by sender of mm before
sending mm and it has also codelivered mm then following must hold ,
V TP(pp)(sender(mm)) ¸ V TM(mm)(sender(mm))
Thus we add an invariant given at Inv 11 in Fig. 35 which state that if the vector
time of process p1 is equal or more than vector time stamp of any sent message
m then p1 must have codelivered the message m. Adding Inv 11 to the model
generates proof obligations associated with other events. Discharging these proof
obligations required other invariants given as Inv 12,13 and 14. Therefore, after
three iteration of invariant strengthening we arrive at a set of invariants which is
su±cient to discharge all proof obligations relating abstract causalorder and vector
clock rules.
39Relationship of abstract total order and sequence number
Replacing abstract variable totalorder by sequence number in the operations of
SendControl and guards of TOdeliver event generate proof obligations. The ¯rst
proof obligation which can not be discharged automatically requires us to prove
following for TOdeliver event.
TOdeliver(pp;mc)PO2 2
6 6
6 6
6
6 6
6
4
mc 2 dom(sender) ^
mtype(mc) = Control ^
(pp 7! messcontrol(mc)) = 2 tdeliver ^
8m:(seqno(messcontrol¡1(m)) < seqno(mc) ) (pp 7! m) 2 tdeliver) ^
m 7! messcontrol(mc) 2 totalorder
)
(pp 7! m) 2 tdeliver
3
7 7
7 7
7
7 7
7
5
It may also be noted that this proof obligation appears due to replacement of
following guard of TOdeliver involving abstract variable totalorder,
8m:((m 7! messcontrol(mc) 2 totalorder ) (pp 7! m) 2 tdeliver)
by the guard involving variable seqno,
8m:((seqno(messcontrol¡1(m)) < seqno(mc) ) (pp 7! m) 2 tdeliver)
Therefore, in order to discharge this proof obligation we add the invariant Inv
15 to our model which relates abstract variable totalorder with the concrete seqno.
This invariant state that if corresponding computation messages of control messages
m1 and m2 are in totalorder then sequence number of m1 is less then sequence
number of m2. We notice that this invariant is su±cient to discharge all proof
obligations generated by SendControl and TOdeliver events.
6.6 Second Re¯nement : Replacing Sequence Number by
Vector Clocks
In the second re¯nement we outline how the need for generating separate se-
quence numbers can be correctly be implemented by the vector clock. It can be
noticed that the total order on the messages in the ¯rst re¯nement is realized with
the sequence numbers. The events SendControl and TOdeliver in the ¯rst re¯ne-
ment are further re¯ned for the elimination of the need of the sequence numbers to
be generated by the sequencer.
The speci¯cations of the Broadcast and CausalDeliver events of ¯rst re¯nement
remains unaltered as none of these events make use of sequence numbers. In the
second re¯nement, the variables seqno and counter are replaced by vector clock
rules. The speci¯cations of the re¯ned SendControl and TOdeliver events are given
in Fig. 36, 37.
As shown in Fig. 36, the operations assigning sequence number to the control
messages is removed in the re¯ned SendControl event. We use the fact that the
vector time stamp of the control message contains enough information required for
todelivery of the messages. Also as shown in Fig. 37, the guard of the event TOde-
liver which contains sequencer numbers in abstract model are replaced by vector
rules. This replacement in the re¯nement generates proof obligations involving
seqno and vector time stamp of messages.
To prove these proof obligations we add Inv 18, shown in Fig. 38 to our re¯ned
model. Adding Inv 18 to the re¯nement require us to add new invariants Inv 19,20
to the re¯nement. A brief description of these invariants is given below.
40correctness by theorem proving. Instead of theorem proving or proving correctness
of trace behavior, our approach is based on de¯ning properties in abstract model
and proving that our model of algorithm is a correct re¯nement of abstract model.
The formal approach considered in this paper is based on Event-B which facil-
itates incremental development of systems. We have used Click'n'Prove B tool for
proof management. This tool generate the proof obligations due to re¯nement and
consistency checking and help discharge proof obligation by the use of automatic
and interactive prover. The majority of proofs are discharged by automatic prover
however some of the complex proofs require the use of the interactive prover. In
the development of a causal order broadcast 67 percent of the proofs are discharged
by the prover automatically. Similarly, in the development of total order broad-
cast and total causal order broadcast respectively 74 percent and 58 percent proofs
are discharged by the automatic prover. The proofs helps us to understand the
complexity of problem and the correctness of the solutions. They also helps us to
discover new system invariants providing a clear insight to the system.
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